


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**Middle East
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MIDDLE EAST – AFRICA – SOUTH ASIA

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

CONTENTS

Iran: [REDACTED] 1	25X1C
Somalia: Siad Has Problems with Ogaden Tribesmen 3	
Angola: Slow Progress in Setting Up Army 4	
Rhodesia: Chitepo Assassinated in Lusaka 6	

Mar 18, 1975

SECRET

SECRET

Iran

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Terrorist groups and antigovernment students have increased their activity in Iran during the past three months. The dissidents lack significant public support, and do not seem to be acting in concert.

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The two main terrorist groups are the People's Sacrifice Guerrillas, a communist group, and the People's Strugglers, a fanatical religious organization. Both are focusing on assassinations of police and SAVAK officials involved in the interrogation, and alleged torture, of arrested dissidents. The latest victim, General Zandipur, head of Iran's anti-dissidence committee, was gunned down on March 17 by members of the People's Sacrifice Guerrillas while riding in his car. Literature left at the scene of another recent attack claimed the victim had been tried by a "People's Court" and condemned for torturing Iranian patriots.

The well-armed terrorists have carried out their attacks in daylight, mostly in Tehran. They seem to be organized in small cells which operate independently to limit the chance that any arrest will hurt the parent organizations.

In other recent antigovernment activity, the latest round of traditional December student disturbances, commemorating the deaths of two university students in 1953, continued through January 1975. Although the university campuses are now outwardly calm, tensions reportedly persist.

Widespread demonstrations also took place in the city of Qom in early January to protest the death of a well-known religious figure while he was

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Mar 18, 1975

1

SECRET

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in police custody. Demonstrations, which centered in the mosques and featured antigovernment speakers, resulted in several injuries and scores of arrests. There were more arrests in Qom last month when ten religious figures and their students were charged with planning to attack the local SAVAK office and to kill its commander.

There is a good chance for more harsh police action and the creation of martyrs. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The recent dissolution of opposition political parties will not improve the government's image in the eyes of dissident intellectuals. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM)

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Mar 18, 1975

2

SECRET

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Somalia

Siad Has Problems with Ogaden Tribesmen


President Siad has reportedly been having problems since early this year with restive Ogaden tribesmen in western Somalia. Somalia, which claims Ogaden inhabited areas in neighboring Ethiopia, has long provided financial and other support to the Somali Ogadenis in an effort to keep alive the threat of an irredentist guerrilla offensive against these areas. The Somali Ogadenis are now accusing Siad of curtailing traditional subsidies and withholding arms, thereby preventing them from mounting such an insurgency.

The Ogaden tribesmen, who also found the subsidies important to their commercial interests, have accused the Somali leader of ignoring their needs to benefit his own tribe. Reports are circulating in Mogadiscio that alienated tribesmen are clandestinely distributing anti-Siad tracts in several cities. Siad has allegedly retaliated by arresting over 400 Ogaden tribesmen and dismissing a number of Ogaden officers from the army. The Egyptian and other Arab embassies in Mogadiscio have also reportedly ended their financial aid to the Ogadenis.

Siad's unwillingness to support the tribesmen at this time is understandable given his current reluctance to take advantage of the unsettled conditions in Ethiopia, Mogadiscio's traditional enemy. Despite the arrival of Soviet arms and aircraft in Somalia in recent years, Siad apparently is not eager for trouble with Ethiopia, and he does not want his Ethiopian policy to be hostage to the unpredictable behavior of the tribesmen. Siad is also probably reluctant to arm the Ogaden tribesmen because of his distrust of any armed group.

The dispute with the tribesmen does not currently pose a threat to the Siad government, according to the US embassy in Mogadiscio. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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Mar 18, 1975

3

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Angola

Slow Progress in Setting Up Army

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25X6 [REDACTED] the Angolan transitional government is making slow progress in setting up a national army that can assume responsibility when the Portuguese withdraw following independence next November. The independence accord signed in January between Portugal and the three Angolan liberation groups calls for the gradual establishment of a 48,000-man force by September. Each of the three liberation groups are obliged to provide 8,000 troops by that time. Portugal will contribute the other 24,000, but these troops are to be withdrawn from Angola within three months after independence.

25X6 [REDACTED] none of the liberation groups supplied its February quota of 500 men, largely because of a lack of coordination and poor staff work by the groups. Moreover, the liberation movements are appointing low caliber officers to the joint general staff that will command the army.

The US consul general in Luanda believes the problems in setting up the national army are more than normal "growing pains." He expects the liberation groups to retain their best officers in order to build up their own private armies. The consul general believes the groups are more interested in intimidating their rivals than building an effective national army.

In the meantime, the Portuguese are disarming the African special forces contingents and local militia organizations created during the colonial period. These personnel will be allowed to join the military forces of the liberation groups.

According to the Portuguese military high command in Luanda, the territory will be divided

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Mar 18, 1975


4

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into six military zones before independence. The unified military force in each zone will be composed of an equal number of troops from each of the three liberation groups and a contingent of Portuguese troops that will equal the total provided by the liberation movements. The zones probably will be commanded by a Portuguese officer. Each nationalist contingent and the Portuguese will be billeted separately and personnel will be integrated only during operations. Lisbon will pay the cost of the Portuguese troops, and the transitional government will fund the contingents from the liberation groups. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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Mar 18, 1975

5

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Rhodesia

Chitepo Assassinated in Lusaka


Herbert Chitepo, a prominent Rhodesian insurgent leader, was killed on March 18 in a bomb explosion outside his home in Lusaka, Zambia. The assassination may have resulted from Chitepo's involvement in feuding that has been going on within the nationalist movement.

Before Rhodesia's four rival nationalist groups merged in an expanded African National Council last December, Chitepo had been the principal leader outside Rhodesia of the Zimbabwe African National Union, the group responsible for most of the rebel activity in Rhodesia. Following the merger and the nationalists' subsequent conclusion of a cease-fire agreement with Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith, Chitepo remained in Zambia as an external representative of the Council. Chitepo was one of the most militant of the nationalist leaders. He argued that the nationalists should not give up the advantages he felt had been gained by the insurgents and only consented to the truce because of pressure from Zambia and Tanzania.

Intense rivalry has persisted among the nationalist groups since the merger and recent reports have indicated that serious, tribal-based feuding has been taking place in Zambia among supporters of the former Zimbabwe African National Union. Chitepo apparently took part in the feuding, which has been marked by kidnappings and shootings.

Smith will almost certainly try to exploit Chitepo's death for his own purpose. Smith is likely to publicize the assassination as an example of the dissension that exists among the nationalists and prevents progress toward a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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Mar 18, 1975

6

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